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Lately I have become interested in medieval sculpture, a medium of art which seems
to open up an unusually wide range of issues appropriate to the heroic scope, if not
exactly the intellectual interests, of Sophus Bugge. My concern is not so much the
medium itself, as the intellectual predicament of its study. In this lecture I have chosen
to focus on Gothic sculpture, of which many ﬁne examples survive in wood in Scan-
dinavia and especially norway.1 My concerns will not be stylistic, iconographic or
technical. Instead I will consider the agency of sculpture, how its function relates to
its purpose, and how that purpose is social. To shed light on these matters I propose
to consider rhetorical engagement.
My lecture proceeds from some premises which should be stated succinctly, and
which have wider applicability. first, ideally the arts must be understood together.
This of course makes demands, sometimes severe demands, on scholars whose train-
ing may favour specialized knowledge of one medium. Art forms may have different
agency; but the arts, including architecture, are often in conversation, and we must
try to get a grip on all of them. Experience and belief have taught me to be slightly
sceptical about the older empiricist model which favoured media-based specialization,
and so in effect analysis not synthesis. The arts I think were in their own way ‘social’,
and the narrative of their development can be understood as a social narrative.
Second, in regard to sociability and engagement, the spectator, the audience and
the context of encounter are key: we have in effect three agencies to work with.
When literary theorists of the post-war era spoke of the rise of the reader and the
‘death’ of the author, they were not always being sympathetic to human authorship.
But the agency of art is only comprehensible in terms of human experience and
engagement. Engagement is intellectually and emotionally active: it is not a matter
simply of passive ‘reception’. It means that audiences take a ‘stance towards’ an arte-
fact, an attitude. This is an ‘affect’, and its underlying principles were derived in the
Middle Ages from Aristotle and the rhetoricians. Importantly, that stance or affect
1 Blindheim 2004; for a range of polychrome woodwork see nadolny 2006.
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necessarily operates within a situation which itself will have agency. I will explore
the idea of the active agency of situations in terms of the idea of ‘occasion’.2
Thirdly, while the discipline of anthropology (understood broadly) has in the
last generation or so transformed the study of medieval art as a functional art, it
strikes me as philosophically valuable to separate, where possible, the function of an
artefact from its purpose: means and ends are not always the same, and it is not clear
that an account of the function of a work of art (let us say, for instance, an altarpiece),
will necessarily account fully for its purpose. An object such as an altarpiece functions
in order to bring something about. Amongst the purposes or ends of such artefacts
is the creation of experience, even – and this has become fashionable once more –
an experience of beauty which is both sensory (i.e. aesthetic) and intellectual. To this
economy of means and ends, the materials from which artefacts were made were sub-
ject. Present-day theories of materiality may occasionally create the impression that
material usage is an aspect of the purpose of artefacts, not their means; that, as Mar-
shall McLuhan (an important voice in the development of this thinking), said, “the
medium is the message”.3
I am not convinced by this type of materialist determinism. Indeed I don’t think
of a ‘savage’, materialist or animist Middle Ages, but of a rhetorical Middle Ages.
Rhetorical engagement by its nature is both mindful and aesthetic. Recent work on
rhetoric and the arts has shown how knowledge in the Middle Ages was profoundly
embodied; but that embodiment was not de-coupled from reason. Mind and body
work together by experience to persuade. The word ‘persuade’ stems from the Latin
suavis – to ‘sweeten’ (Carruthers 2013: 102). If we are persuaded we are sweetened,
and it is the role of the persuader to use rhetorical technique, the agency of words or
art, to bring about conviction. Conviction is a balanced conﬁdent state of belief – an
idea feels ‘right’ and if so can be translated into and end such as judgement or action.
This I call the ‘conviction purpose’ of art. This is signiﬁcantly different from early
modern and modern idea of the aesthetic based on the thinking of Immanuel Kant,
as a form of disinterested contemplation of a thing for its own beauty rather than
some ulterior end such as pleasure or utility. It is also a social, not an individual idea,
because conviction is aided by agreement. What it does not necessarily require are
modern ideas of personality, interiority and psychology. We recognize these, of
course, but we see that historically they are different, and it is the recognition of that
difference that marks out the historical approach.
2 The best introduction to this is Carruthers 2013: 13–14, 102 for rhetorical occasion.
3 Explored in McLuhan 1964.
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Occasion, monumentality and affect
Let me swiftly set the scene by laying out some key ideas more or less as conclusions.
We all know that between 1050 and 1300 a building boom in church construction
brought into being the giant sculpted church facade. In understanding Romanesque
and Gothic Spain, france, Germany and England where such facades are plentiful, I
stress ﬁrst the role of public monumentality.4 The great church facades are public
monuments, not occasions for personal psychological engagement. Important to this
is the public and rhetorical notion of occasion itself. We now think of an ‘occasion’
as something like a special event, an occurrence. The practices of rhetoric took this
idea of occasion to mean the context or purpose for saying or writing something:
some things are best said when a particular occasion, in the sense of opportunity,
arises. The occasion itself gives us a sense of what is right or opportune to say or
write: it guides our sense of appropriateness, in other words decorum. A doorway,
whether in a church facade or penetrating through a screen within it, bringing us into
the presence of Christ and his witnesses, the saints and prophets, may well favour us
or not, as we deserve. But the door, as an occasion, is not simply a threshold or limen
marking out moments of human crisis or transformation but a starting-point for a
process: a large portal in encountered and gets things and us ‘going’, and through its
artiﬁcial surfaces, it directs and gestures.5 The extraordinary concentrations of ﬁgu-
rative and ornamental art framing church doorways, whether at the stave churches at
Urnes or fåberg or at Chartres cathedral, use conscious displays of artiﬁce to struc-
ture and direct the experience of confronting and entering a building: artiﬁce itself
possesses agency, the force that Alfred Gell called – not entirely helpfully – ‘enchant-
ment’.6
The diﬃculty with the idea of enchantment, understood historically, is that as
a quasi-magical force it implies an overruling of mindfulness. This was exactly not
the case with the ancient and medieval concept of monumentality. Isidore of Sevile
reminds us in writing of the word ‘tomb’ (Etymologies XV.xi) that a monument is so
named because it ‘admonishes the mind’ (mentem monere) to remember the deceased
person... Thus both ‘monument’ and ‘memory’ are so called from ‘the admonition of
the mind (mentis admonitio)’.7 Such facades may stand before us four-square and
showily ornate like a Roman gate. They may, as at Lincoln cathedral, actually emulate
the dimensions and so grandeur of Roman triumphal arches. The fact that these fa-
4 for those unfamiliar with the range of the Gothic material see Williamson 1995.
5 I refer to the celebrated theory of ‘liminality’, Van Gennep 1960.
6 for which see Gell 1992.
7 I use the edition by Barney 2006: 313.
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1. Stave church portal, fåberg church, Gudbrandsdal (Oppland), 12th century
(© Kulturhistorisk museum, UiO, lisens CC By-SA 4.0)
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cades, as at that at Amiens are so thickly populated reminds us too of the major Chris-
tian tradition of likening the Church as a whole to a celestial city, in the tradition of
Augustine and Beatus of Liebana.
The point about such visions is not simply that their physical presence is city-like:
their entire imaginary is social. What is personal psychology and mood in the face of
the ecclesia militans and ecclesia triumphans, or the ecclesia celestis? These are not private
but public, even political, thoughts and ambitions experienced at all times and in all
conditions, and in whatever mood we ourselves may be in. Portals affect and create
a sense of expectation; they promise something; they propose a certain ‘style’. But
above all they work in the ﬁrst instance in the public, not the private domain. Portals
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are a form of locus communis, which is to say a form of argument applicable to many
cases not just one (Rubinelli 2009).
It follows from an emphasis on monumentality that something may be amiss
with the recent tendency, emerging in part from within the history of the emotions,
to examine the mimetic feats of Gothic sculpture as models of empathy, as plotting
‘inward’ reaction (Jung 2006; 2013). The passions or affects are fundamental to the
persuasive and human function of art – to repeat, an idea must feel right to convince
- but there is room for scepticism about modern empathy theory and the essentially
naturalistic model of the emotions and their expression which accompanies it. In my
view – and I have only time now to assert this rather than set it out fully – portals
dramatize and exemplify ethical choice, but do not choose for us. Medieval works of
this type do not clamp down meaning or response, but direct us to think. They do
not, because they cannot, engage in emotional diktat. Once we understand this di-
rective, but not conclusive, role an extraordinary liberation of possibilities results,
not least for an art form, the church portal, which has always been seen as the active
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3. Erfurt Cathedral, north portals,
c. 1330 (author)
CM 2017 ombrukket 7.qxp_CM  09.02.2018  12:40  Side 12
programmatic transmitter of dogma and doctrine to passive audiences. The truth, I
think, was more interesting, more transactional.
Take the Wise and foolish Virgins carved around 1330 on the unusual triangular
portal on the north side of Erfurt Cathedral (Lehmann 1988; Sciurie 1993–94). The
two outer faces of the wedge-shaped structure have portals which can be seen simul-
taneously directly from the north.
We choose our path accordingly. The north-eastern portal has a Cruciﬁxion,
Virgin and Child and Apostles, all calm and decorous. In marked contrast the south-
eastern portal has the Wise and foolish Virgins, Ecclesia and Synagoga. The foolish
Virgins are a compendium of theatrical gesture with discomposed and downcast facial
features, hands raised to cheeks in despair and arms ﬂung up and wrung together.
The Wise Virgins with Ecclesia are contrasting models of complacency. This is obvi-
ous rhetorical synkrisis, which is to say the comparison of the best and the worst,
brought home by ampliﬁcation from the Vulgate terms for wise and foolish, prudentes
and fatuae in Matthew 25:2. These qualities are made fully present aesthetically,
mimetically, in the dispositions or schemata of the ﬁgures. They have a thrusting qual-
ity and hence, to some eyes perhaps, a sort of forwardness or vulgarity.
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4. Erfurt cathedral, foolish Virgins with Synagoga, c. 1330 with later restorations
(author)
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But the point is this: whatever emotional narrative we might attribute to these
contrasting and eloquent images of order and dissolution, it is not entirely evident
what we ourselves should feel towards them. Are we to feel warm empathy, or just
satisfaction at the natural outcome of the harsh workings of God’s justice and mercy?
To my mind the history of the representation (i.e. the crafting) of emotion should
not be confused with a modern naturalist or ‘hydraulic’ theory of emotions which
sees them as spontaneous emanations. The basically aristotelian regime of emotional
understanding most common at this time would have understood immediately that
emotions are things to be rationally governed, constrained and crafted, thereby con-
ceding not their naturalism but their artiﬁciality.8 That is why the term ‘affect’, im-
plying an active stance or attitude towards something, may be less misleading than
the modern language of empathy. We might add – though moral philosophers seem
to adopt different positions on this - that there is no necessary connection between
exciting emotion in people and making them more fraternal, sororal or charitable:
empathy, as opposed (say) to anger or admiration, is not necessarily a constitutive
precondition for positive moral judgement.9
In short, these affects should not necessarily be judged by modern ideas of emo-
tion or morality. Like artworks, the more sophisticated emotions are artiﬁcial, are
educable dispositions. This belief underwrote some of the most powerful pastoral
and educational techniques of the Middle Ages.10 Engagement with an artefact is
thus the meeting of two agencies under the conditions of an occasion. The ﬁgurae
are demonstrative guides, means of indicating, colours, which purposively engender
affects, which incline or bend our intentions. They are demonstrative acts. That
which is striking, attractive or human-seeming is deployed as a technique to produce
and guide thinking and felt responses according to a path, a narrative of understanding
in the light of evidentia. The end of this creation of sensation is not calculated arousal
of feelings because emotions are ‘activities’ on the way to something else: they are
not themselves the outcome. One possible outcome of such direction is change of
mind: metanoia, or repentance. To consider the ﬁguration of Gothic portals is to en-
counter something very like the movement of characters in the dramatic tradition of
Japanese noh plays or English medieval morality plays which possess a set of stock
characters immediately recognizable to the audience.11 To imagine that the purpose of
8 fortenbaugh 2002; the literature on medieval emotions is large: Rosenwein 2002, 2006
for an introduction.
9 See for example Bloom 2017.
10 for Aristotle and the 13th-century pastoral regime of the church, Binski 2004.
11 An analogy drawn from MacIntyre 1984: 27–31.
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such ﬁgures is to be expressive or to engender emotion is to think Romantically, not
rhetorically. By thinking rhetorically, too, we also concede that the meeting of the
agencies of subject, object and situation is also precarious. It is for this reason that
art experience and aesthetic effect are in the full sense of the word occasional rather
than normative. 
Representation and materiality
This brings me to representation. So far I have outlined a rhetorical, social and public
model of engagement in order to shape a critique of modern Gothic emotivism. My
interest is in the artiﬁciality of art, not its naturalism. This is why I think we can
move through sculpture to ponder other models of criticism. I have in mind especially
the kind of thinking proposed by Caroline Bynum in her book on Christian Materi-
ality written under the inﬂuence of hans Belting (Bynum 2011: 15–123). few scholars
have done more than Professor Bynum to excite interest in and knowledge of the re-
lationship between art and belief in the Middle Ages, and for this reason the weight
of her opinion matters. here, I sketch in only a few caveats, but they are important
ones. first, in my view the underlying sympathy of Christian Materiality is animistic.
It is inclined to the view that when medieval people saw a statue of the Virgin Mary
they may often have believed it was the Virgin Mary. Second, it attributes agency to
the ‘materiality’ of art. Third, it couples together the animist and materialist in order
to argue that medieval art is not primarily rational, but embodied. It is not an art of
illusion or representation, but of materialist substitution. What this model does not
formulate or account for adequately is human agency. In fact human agency and
human crafting seem to be removed from the equation almost entirely both at the
level of crafting and viewer engagement. The socio-rhetorical model as I have set it
out here is quite different. Like the ‘materialist’ doctrine – which of course accom-
panies Theology as its dialectical opposite and companion – it stresses the absolute
centrality of embodied experience. But it differs in stressing the way that mind and
body are linked. Artiﬁce (i.e. art) allows and accounts both of the function and the
purpose of art, and engagement is vital.
My ﬁrst objection to the materialist-theological position is that it takes little or
no interest at all in crafting, artiﬁce and the technical realities of material study, and
seems to have no serious view of the role of aesthetic experience. In short, in my
view it suffers from a limited critical method. Let me take a practical example near
at hand in Oslo. The many very ﬁne carved and painted Cruciﬁxes remaining in nor-
way from the 13th and 14th centuries such as that from Tretten show that while oak
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(quercus) tended to be used for the cruciﬁx ﬁgure, pine (pinus) was used for the actual
cross.12
Why? It is hard to point to a speciﬁc symbolism for such woods, but it is easy
to give a practical account of their character. All carvers will know that stones work
differently under the chisel, and are suited to different ends: marbles and freestones
have different qualities and uses. So too with woods – the hardwoods like oak taking
detail differently from softwoods such as pine or limewood, the latter characterized
in a 14th-century English text as useless for building but excellent for carving. Oak is
durable and takes ﬁner detail than pine, and was probably thought more suitable for
a detailed human ﬁgure such as Christ. Pine can take the vigorous ornamental carving
proper to a Cross and is a lighter material than dense oak, so its use for the main
structural element reduced the weight of an object that had to be raised or suspended.
These issues were matters for methodical technical understanding, experience; read-
12 Blindheim 2004 for examples.
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5. Crucifix, figure probably oak, cross
probably pine, mid-late 13th century
with 15th-century polychromy, from
Tretten I, øyer (Oppland) (Photo:
Svein A. Wiik (© Kulturhistorisk
museum, UiO, lisens CC By-SA 4.0)
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ing and going with the grain.13 finally the Crosses were painted and gilding, so mask-
ing their underlying material character.
The ﬁrst lesson in the study of any material is therefore to begin not with some
theory about materiality, materiality being in effect a reiﬁcation of substance, not the
gritty reality. It is to consider a material’s sourcing, its handling in a workshop, and
its masking and manipulation by tradition and experience. It was 19th-century writers
such as John Ruskin and E. E. Viollet-le-Duc who, as a matter of ideology, gave us
the concept of the truth, the ‘sincerity’ of materials and the honest display of structure.
To understand why this pure-minded, artsy-craftsy, loftiness is objectionable to an
understanding of the Middle Ages, and why practicalities are foremost and not an-
cillary, we have to get our hands dirty and understand that medieval materiality is re-
lational, not essential. Materials do not and cannot assert by themselves – they are
good for some things, useless for others; they are part of a ﬁeld, a network, which
involves many factors, craft and signiﬁcation included, but also recollection, inherited
cultural practice, and the poetics of things. To put it another way, materials, like the
arts and like their spectators, enjoyed a social life whether they liked it or not.
Experience and method aside, then, all materials form part of a prior represen-
tational or imaginative order of relationships which craft negotiates and judges. Wood
in itself also spoke differently from other materials. Its liberating power as a medium
in which to push form to its most outré extent, as in late-medieval German altarpiece
and sacrament house-carving, needs no comment (Timmermann 2009; Kavaler
2012). Woodworking of this virtuosic type challenged the primacy of stone as an in-
ventive medium and in some ways surpassed it. Stone spoke and speaks of the per-
manent, the monumental, that which, like a statue, ‘stands’. Wood, in contrast, is a
growing and mutating thing: to a greater extent than stone it is immanent, it ‘tends’
in certain directions through its grains and knots and curves. In all this it has much
in common with other organic materials such as ivory, ‘tending’ towards the curved
form of the tusk from which it is extracted. This tending or intentio was useful be-
cause it pointed to and aﬃrmed a representational and metaphorical ordering that
started in, but went beyond, a material’s inherent character that skilled craftsmen
could read and respect (Carruthers 2013: 167–172). Crafting an image is something
done in a medium not with it – in fact the word ‘medium’, implying something which
is merely a transparent vehicle which is not itself a force possessing agency, misleads
us. We think ‘in’ wood as we talk or sing ‘in’ music. This is not a translation, because
content and material become part of one phenomenon which, well handled, speaks
in unison.
13 Plahter 2014 for a valuable survey of the data.
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Take the issue of ﬁnish, surface. finishes varied with the intention of the object.
A key innovation was the emergence by about 1300 in Germany, Italy and Scandi-
navia of the so-called Cruciﬁxus dolorosus, so to speak the agonized Cruciﬁx: this was
a deliberate intensiﬁcation of the Gothic form of Cruciﬁx, apparent from around
1260, in which Christ’s feet were pinned high up beneath his thighs while his torso
and head hung markedly downwards and forwards, so stretching the arms into a y
shape.14 With the change in proﬁle arose a deliberate selection of alarming carved ef-
fects of theological import, Christ’s grotesquely stretched and sinuous arms and burst-
ing emaciated ribcage answered to the text ‘they have numbered all my bones. And
they have looked and stared upon me’ in the so-called Passion Psalm (21:18), as shown
on the cross at Cross at S. Maria im Kapitol in Cologne.
Importantly, all things concerning Christ and his abjection are worked into and onto
the surface of his ﬂayed skin, since, while before the later 13th century Christ’s skin
is generally fair, even delicate, the wounds marked yet circumscribed, in the Cruci-
14 The standard study remains De francovich 1938.
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6. Crucifix, Sankt Maria im
Kapitol, Cologne, c. 1304
(Bildarchiv foto Marburg)
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ﬁxus dolorosus his entire body is leprous, pocked and peppered with the bleeding
holes of ﬂagellation, the side-wound bursting outwards in great gouts of blood ren-
dered in painted wood or plaster.
from one point of view the Cruciﬁxus dolorosus troubles the idea of mimesis:
such ghastly representations appear strange, archaic even in their vividness before
the eyes; yet in the light of the foregoing it is clear that their intention and appearance
must be understood dialectically, relationally. They are to be experienced and read
against something else, for their nature – their aesthetic and ideological nature - is
contrarian. Many texts and artworks perform by opposition, oppositio. Their contrary
is the smooth courtly visual language of Gothic as established as an elegant lingua
franca in the second half of the 13th century: to this new reﬁnement, the reﬁnement
of the royal, aristocratic and clerical patrons, the horrible Crosses are a rebuke, so to
speak an ‘anti-decorum’, an undoing. As the Cologne instance shows, their perfor-
mative or occasional space was the contested urban milieu, the milieu that could at
once produce the horrors of S. Maria im Kapitol and in the same years the smarmy,
if elegant, swaying and beaming polychrome stone statuary around the choir of the
cathedral church of Cologne (Williamson 1995: 196–197, ﬁgs. 293–294). The ugli-
ness, deformity, falling-away of the dolorous Crosses embodied a skilled discipline,
a calculated rhetoric of contrast, not a deﬁciency: being ‘uncrafted’ was itself an aspect
of style. In the contrast of the rough and the smooth, the humble and the proud, the
criminal and the fastidious, lay a fundamental and ancient difference in the register
of speech: between roughness, rusticity or barbarity, sermo rusticus, and urbanity,
sermo urbanus (Ramage 1961). That difference of speech had an important history
and an important future, in the history of ‘style’ in western Europe. yet it registered
not primarily in the stuff of which things were made but rather in the workbench
toolbox of eloquence and understanding.
That quite sophisticated ethical and visual calculation was involved in the mak-
ing of artefacts in ideologically sensitive contexts – such as churches belonging to the
Cistercian order – is apparent in the case of objects in the halfway house between
fully-formed sculpture, and paint. The method in such cases was to create a subtle
low relief image in wood, whose soft projecting surfaces were then tinted yet brought
further forward, creating a delicate aesthetic of projection. In the case of the ‘legisla-
tive’ aesthetics of the Cistercian order, where clear prohibitions were repeatedly is-
sued concerning sculpture and colours other than white, the preoccupation had always
been far more with relationships of tone (white, grey) than hue. This not only pro-
voked great ingenuity within the stated rules but created very ﬁne powers of discrim-
ination without hue, a sort of collective visual sensitivity. A ﬁne and characteristically
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large (5.56 m. tall) example is from the Cistercian abbey church of Sorø in Zealand,
Denmark, dating to the mid 13th century (nyborg 2006: 253 and ﬁg. 10; nyborg
2013).
It is executed not in full sculpture but in bas-relief with an extraordinarily pleas-
ing play of tone and surface - as with many ivories or limewood carvings, polychromy
is not essential to its effect, though discreetly coloured it originally was. The work
hovers gracefully and slightly hauntingly between media, not least because reference
beyond the Cross to anything precious is very markedly restrained, limited only to
the sunk quatrefoils and ovals which run along the edges of the Cross.
A moment ago I used the word ‘pleasing’ of such effects. We might justiﬁably
call the effect of the Sorø cross ‘bland’, i.e. mild or soothing. One can see how such
effects were regarded as effects of intimate restraint, softened speech proper to an
Collegium Medievale 2017
20 Paul Binski
7. Crucifix, polych-
romed oak, height 5.56
m, c. 1260, Sorø Church,
Zealand, Denmark
(Photo: Sofus Bengtsson
© national Museum of
Denmark, Copenhagen)
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enclosed monastic choir, still social but contrasting with the more frank, open, public
speech of the horror-crosses of the period. The key point in such instances was some-
how to strike a balance between ﬂat, blank abstraction and the provision of just
enough engaging detail to sustain the role of the image in providing evidentia.
none of this has to do with Romantic notions of honesty: it has to do with
rhetorical and social notions of occasion, of decorum, as the contexts in which style
is negotiated. honesty was a matter for the marketplace, of ascertaining commodity
value or loyal workmanship, and only thereby moral value. The evidence of the
Parisian Book of Trades (Livre des métiers) compiled c. 1268 points up the numerous
forms of sharp practice by statue-makers and those who sold fausses oeuvres, i.e. passed
base things off as precious. There were trade regulations for image-makers from
other parts of Europe, such as the norwegian regulations for líkneskjusmíðir or
‘image-smiths’.15 In Paris the regulations were certainly harder on the sculptors than
on the painters, those two related branches of ‘imaging’. Carvers were limited to one
apprentice each, might not work at night and could not produce images speculatively
for fear that they might be purchased for mischief. Painters could have as many ap-
prentices as they wanted and could (and did) work by night. Perhaps those who made
things susceptible to idolatry needed closer watching. There again, a painter or sculp-
tor could only claim that a work was gilded if its gold was laid over silver rather than
tin.
The point is this: medieval social regulation of this type indicates the extent to
which the work of painters and sculptors was not ‘honest’, the extent to which it
could puzzle, even cheat, as well as give pleasure. Some of the ﬁnest surviving artefacts
we have from the court circles of Paris and London from the time of the Livre des
métiers such as the great high altarpiece made for Westminster Abbey at the end of
the reign of henry III to the most exacting standards of the day, are miracles of the
alchemical skill of craft which converted ﬁnely-carved oak – carved to tolerances
within millimetre or two – plaster of Paris, paste, several different forms of gilding,
stained glass, silver foil, linseed oil paint and varnishes - into a liturgical object which,
for normal public scrutiny, looked like a blend of panel painting and truly precious
metalwork.16
If this is not illusion, what is? As the Livre des métiers shows, it takes a trained
eye, the eye of a connoisseur, a player who ‘knows’, to tell the real from the fake.
And those who know, the experts, are unlikely to have been the public. The issue
here is the deceitful character of materials not their assertiveness. The notion of sin-
15 Sears 2006 for Paris, Blindheim 1952: 87–108 for the norwegian regulations.
16 Published in depth in Binski & Massing 2009.
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cerity, of the frank speech of materials in such instances of which many hundreds
survive from the Middle Ages, fails us totally in regard to such shameless confections,
such pleasurable and admirable triumphs of artful play. It is only the new forensic
expertise of modern art history, after all, that has allowed us to know for certain what
anything is made of at all.
At the heart of the last paragraph was the word ‘illusion’. Illusion is artful con-
trivance, a product of sensation. The word’s basis lies in the Latin noun for ‘play’,
ludus, and its character as an experience of artefacts involves regard for ﬁne, subtle
and appealing workmanship, the ‘play’ of artiﬁcial effects (Carruthers 2013: 16–44).
however, as I have said, there is a body of opinion which suggests that medieval art
was not given to illusion or mimesis at all; according to it, illusion and mimesis were
the preserve of Renaissance art that deliberately tried to trick the senses, while me-
dieval artists stressed instead the objective or material character of art. Thus Bynum,
in Christian Materiality states that while “Renaissance artists aimed for mimetic, il-
lusionistic modes of representation that deliberately tried to trick the senses... In con-
trast, medieval artists expected viewers to notice and admire the stuff they employed
as stuff... not as painterly illusion” (Bynum 2011: 53–54). This elision is problematical
because it is founded precisely on the type of Renaissance value-system that the me-
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dieval materialist argument seeks to clear away: it restates what L. B. Alberti has to
say at the end of Book 2 of Della Pittura, namely we don’t add real gold to pictures,
we imitate its effect (Spencer 1977: 85). This dismissal of the illusionistic (and there-
fore rationalistic) intentions of medieval art is consistent with an emphasis on body,
not mind. But it also misrepresents important aspects of medieval aesthetic activity.
first, it runs entirely against the evidence that enjoyable illusion, a play with
subtlety, craft and mimesis, was an important concern with medieval art tout cour.
We are left with the choice of accepting and imposing a Renaissance model of illusion,
or none. Second, it has the resultant effect of pressing medieval art into a materialist
corner by applying to it a questionable theory of representation. Its body of beliefs
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is founded on a ‘Beltingite’ anthropology of medieval images which indeed sees them
as ‘images’ (deﬁned functionally) before the era of ‘art’ (deﬁned aesthetically) (Belting
1994). The ultimate charge against it is that it is reductive, and that in emphasizing
the speech of materials it sidelines human facture and human imaginative faculty:
hence the reiﬁcation of ‘stuff’ as something living or savage and not mindful or shaped
by human hands and intentions.
Let me take this one stage further by suggesting that medieval images did not
create a representational order through their materiality: rather, that materiality pre-
supposed a representational order. The image sanctiﬁed the object. That is why fa-
miliar images such as that of the Virgin Mary made from painted wood from hedal
in norway might equally be rendered in a huge range of materials, from silver gilt to
alabaster, to painted wood, ivory or stone. 
The use of the materials could be explained as much by pragmatic or aesthetic
reasons as theological or signiﬁcatory ones; but the materials could be exchanged
without fundamentally undermining the character or function of the image. To put
it in the familiar terms of aristotelian causality, their material cause can be exchanged
in a way that their formal and ﬁnal causes cannot. To learn, suddenly, that a gor-
geously-fashioned image of Mary is, in fact, an image of Venus, would surely be rad-
ically to reframe any rememorative or symbolic character that the image and its
materials might have. Recognition, prior belief and representation - human faculties
– matter and matter fundamentally.
It follows that in order to understand the ‘occasion’ of materiality we have to
have a theory of representation in place. So I take issue with the view that medieval
images are reducible to their materiality. To show why representation is not substi-
tution let’s consider the representation of something that tests all artists, and yet
which is (in theory) easily substitutable: hair. hair is very diﬃcult to represent and
bothersome to carve. The single most extraordinary example of the eloquence of
Gothic hair in this period is provided by the ﬁgure of St Mary Magdalen, one of a
set of saints from the interior of the collegiate church at Ecouis in normandy com-
pleted by about 1313.17
She is as astonishing a conception as any in Gothic art. Mary is barefooted and
her pose studiedly hip-shot. here surface acts as a color, an eloquent integument, for
hair has become vestment. That the effect of this almost Ovidian metamorphosis is
both direct and subtle is clear. The long tooled waves are at once strange and sugges-
tive; a 14th-century word for them, from the Latin undatus for ‘wavy’, was ‘oundy’,
from the heraldic term undé. The ‘oundy’ hair creates delight; but it also warns us by
17 for the church and its sculptures, Gillerman 1994.
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stirring mixed affects within us. We can understand what’s at stake by thinking about
our version of this mixture in the word ‘kinky’. hair is at one level frankly and un-
mistakably ascetic. But here the agency is more borderline; by its very appearance,
the Ecouis ﬁgure explores moral-aesthetic wandering to the point of near error, from
which Mary herself, in exile, is retrieving herself.
Mary is all hair, all image, and it is the image that carries and gets across the val-
ues. The point is that in a case such as this, a materialist substitution could not work.
The vitality of the idea lies in the way hair is worked, represented, made eloquent.
Actual substitution of hair could be effected, as it was on many late-medieval religious
images in southern and eastern Germany. 
Collegium Medievale 2017
The Rhetorical Occasions of Gothic Sculpture 25
10. St Mary Magdalen, sculpture
from collegiate church of Écouis,
normandy, after 1311 (Gilles Berizzi
and Thierry le Mage)
CM 2017 ombrukket 7.qxp_CM  09.02.2018  12:40  Side 25
Andreas Wunhart, an early 15th-century sculptor in this region, commemorated his
dead daughter, a nun, by using her own hair on a cruciﬁed Christ that he had made
for her nunnery, in a truly ‘sponsorial’ gesture which understood the hair to be a
relic.18 But, at the risk of reductio ad absurdam, an image of Mary Magdalen covered
in a mass of transplanted body-length hair would be repellent, even comical. Part of
the comedy would be the justiﬁable perception than in such a case substitution would
be a product of idleness, as idle as applying a wig or hair-extensions, a cheat. In this
sense it is correct to see the dressing-up in real clothes of images of the Virgin Mary
as non-representational. Substitution adds less than representation because it is not
mindful in the same way. A crafted representation is a thinking-through of an image,
a considered reworking, not a dressing-up of it, which is really no more than presen-
tation. So, I suggest, we need a theory of representation because the agency of the
image lies not in its ontological status (whether or not the statue of the Magdalen ‘is’
the Magdalen) but in the way the image’s perceptible surfaces as an image, work.
18 Example drawn from Recht 2008: 214.
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Ontology is not central to this issue, and empty aestheticism is not the alternative.
What I want to get across is the importance of critical engagement as a product of
full sensory, aesthetic and rhetorical engagement.
And consider materials themselves. The roots of materiality study lie in a sem-
inal text of materiality study as cultural history, Michael Baxandall’s The Limewood
Sculptors of Renaissance Germany (1980). The recent rise of materiality study has an
open and elective aﬃnity with a rebalancing of the senses away from sight to touch.
It implies an entire epistemology of the senses, a rebalancing of agency away from
human agency towards the agency or vibrancy of ‘stuff’.19 I intend no disrespect to
the environmentally aware in questioning the idea that in artefactual criticism (as op-
posed to ecotheory) there is such a thing as a naturally vibrant materiality. The human
imaginary is inescapable in the study of material culture. Materials come ready-
freighted with signiﬁcation because their usages are old, often traditional, and it is
hard to see how their values could ever be separated from cultural understanding and
so historical context. In this sense ‘natural’ meaning always has to contend with cul-
tural superimposition. This was undoubtedly true of some of the most important
language of materials in the Middle Ages, as in the ancient world. Materials were
not necessarily seen as themselves but as things subjected to artiﬁce which were ‘seen
as’ something else. This is proved by the richness of Byzantine and western medieval
ekphrasis. Paulus Silentarius’s 6th-century description of the ambo and interior of
hagia Sophia in Constantinople is a case in point: each object in the church, such as
the elaborate marbled ambo or pulpit, becomes the rhetorical occasion for a kind of
associative venture, in which the polychromy of materials is ‘seen as’ eddying water,
or boxwood, or bees-wax; or is seen to bloom like the ﬂowers of the ﬁeld, the white
lilies mingling with roses, or anemone: we hear and then see by enargeia ‘a rose bloom
mingled with pallor’, the stones having ‘the fair brightness of human ﬁngernails’,
being ‘rosy with a tinge of white’, or ‘white with a tinge of ﬁery red’, stones with
‘veins’ which together ﬂush ‘with purple, like the blood of the Laconian shell’ (Mango
1972: 92–93; Barry 2007). Their appreciation involves a conjuration of other images,
other materials. Romanesque church decoration of the sort in Saint-hilaire in Poitiers
makes great play with the conjuration of such effects in paint. 
Ekphrasis, a rhetorical method, underscores my point that in critical method
we must understand relationships – between materials, things and their consumers,
the imaginatively ‘engaged’. Things do not speak by themselves. This is what I mean
by cultural superimposition. Experience does not stop at materials; it starts with them.
19 for ‘vibrancy’, Bennett 2010.
Collegium Medievale 2017
The Rhetorical Occasions of Gothic Sculpture 27
CM 2017 ombrukket 7.qxp_CM  09.02.2018  12:40  Side 27
****
My lecture ends at this point because I hope I have said enough to sketch out what I
mean by rhetorical engagement. My view is that rhetorical culture provides a pow-
erful and, more importantly, authentic means of accessing the agency of what I will
persist in calling medieval art. It creates a language for critical method which is based
on language and ideas common to the ancient and medieval worlds. It allows us to
take care when we speak generally of the emotions as if these things were not histor-
ically mediated. It comes to grips with artiﬁce, and so human culture itself. It respects
the idea that aesthetic experiences are in the ﬁrst instance occasional, not normative.
It respects human agency while understanding that natural things ‘tend’, like the beau-
tiful curve of an ivory tusk. It understands that art objects – as in any social life, work
with and against each another. It favours play and illusion as important dynamics. It
is not necessarily or solely ‘theological’. And it also serves the purpose of shaking
things up a bit. The old neoplatonic and intellectualist models of medieval aesthetics
of the 20th century need supplementing. Of course, the use of rhetoric must never be
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understood as a key, or as the ‘end’ of our encounter with the Middle Ages. It is a
tool, it serves a purpose; its nature is not theoretical, but practical. 
****
I am most indebted to Kaja Kollandsrud and Ebbe nyborg and for their assistance
in illustrating this paper.
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